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1. Background and Motivations 
This article presents a dynamic account of questions and focus which combines the 
logical appeal of the partition theory of questions with the empirical strength of the 
structured meaning account of questions and focus. 
, 
A dynamic analysis which treats meanings as context change potentials 
(e.g. Stalnaker, Kamp, Heim, Groenendijk & Stokho!) will provide us with a sub­
stantial account of the dependence of focused answers on the context set up by 
their preceding questions. Questions pose conditions on the focal structure of their 
answers (paul 1880) and can further restrict the domain of subsequent focusing op­
erators like only (e.g. Zimmermann, von Stechow 1991, Jager 1996, von Fintel 
1995). As an illustration consider the following example: 
(1) a. Who did John introduce to Sue? 
b. Which gentlemen did John introduce to Sue? 
c. John introduced only [BiU]F to Sue. 
d. *John introduced only Bill to [Sue]F . 
After question (la) or (lb), only an answer with the focal structure in (lc) is felici­
tous or congruent. Answer (1d) is out. Consider now the congruent answer in (1c). 
After question (1a), answer (1c) means 'The only person John introduced to Sue is 
Bill ' .  After (lb), it can mean 'The only gentleman John introduced to Sue is Bill ' .  
Standard analyses of focus define congruence in terms of  identity between 
the question meaning and the focal alternatives of the answer (e.g. von Stechow 
1991, Roberts 1996), and identify the domain of focusing operators like only with 
the set of focal alternatives (e.g. Rooth 1985). In our example, the two distinct 
questions (1a) and (1b) pose the same conditions on the focal structures of their 
answers and can have different effects on the quantificational domain of subsequent 
only. These two facts constitute a problem for these standard theories unless they 
come equipped with a smart analysis of the dynamics of domain restric/ion which 
plays a role in these cases. 
Elegant dynamic analyses of questions have been developed in the tradition 
of the partition theory of Groenendijk and Stokhof 1984. In the partition theory, 
the meaning of a question is identified with the set of meanings of all its complete 
answers. In a dynamic setting, questions partition information states, and answers 
eliminate blocks of these partitioned contexts (see Groenendijk 1998-99, but also 
Jager 1996 and Hulstijn 1997). These theories in which interrogatives and indica­
tives update a context, constitute a simple model of how information in discourse 
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is organized by the question-answer relation (Carlson 1983, Roberts 1996). The 
notion of a partial or complete answer is specified in terms of entailment which 
is uniformly defined for indicative and interrogative sentences. Although logically 
very appealing, these theories are, empirically, not completely satisfactory. Parti-
tions seem to be too coarse-grained for a proper treatment of focus and constituent 
answers. For example, Groenendijk 1999 cannot account for the different content 
expressed by a constituent answer like (2c) after (2a) and after (2b), for the two 
questions, having the same set of complete answers, induce exactly the same parti-
tion. 
(2) a. Who smokes? 
b. Who doesn't  smoke? 
c. [John]F .  
Related difficulties also arise for theories in the Hamblin!Karttunen/Rooth 
tradition, e.g. problems with multiple foci (Krifka 1992) and alternative questions 
(von Stechow 1991,  Krifka 2001). The standard treatment of alternatives as sets 
of (propositional) answers is not fined-grained enough and for a proper account we 
need the abstracts underlying the questions (see also Ginzburg 1995 and van Rooy 
1997) and direct access to focus, i.e. structured meanings. 
In a structured meaning account we have fitting analyses of questions 
and focus: questions denote abstracts, AXc/>, i.e. functions that when applied to 
the meaning of the possible constituent answers yield the meaning of the corre­
sponding full sentential answers; and focus leads to a partition of the semantic 
value of an expression into a background part, also a function, and a focus part: 
(AXc/>, a) . Although structured meanings seem to supply us with the right level of 
fine-grainedness, this account does not assume interrogatives to belong to a uniform 
category or semantic type and, therefore, lacks an elegant analysis of examples like 
(3) which involves the embedding and coordination of questions: 
(3) Adam knows whether it's Mary 's party, who will go and who invited whom. 
In what follows we will extend Gawron's (1996) dynamic model of domain 
restriction with an analysis of interrogative sentences. Utilizing the close correspon­
dence between information states in dynamic semantics - sets of world-assignment 
pairs - and structured propositions, the obtained analysis of questions and focus 
will solve the discussed difficulties combiniqg the positive sides of partitions and 
structured meanings, and will allow a number of further applications, such as a 
promising account of topic marking in English. 
2. An update semantics of questions and focus 
In Gawron 1996, the introduction of a quantificational operator is separated by the 
introduction of the quantificational domain. The latter is allowed to be fixed non-
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locally. The intuition is that domains of quantification are constructed by combining 
constraints that arise from different sources. These constraints are encoded in so 
called environments which map variables to sets of possible assignments encoding 
information about which values are possible for them. We propose to interpret 
the semantic contribution of interrogative sentences in term of extensions of these 
Gawronian environments. In our formalism, an environment is a sequence of sets 
of world-assignment pairs. We will take these sets to represent the topics under 
discussion in the current context. Interrogative sentences will be analyzed as setting 
up new topics, or expanding on previously introduced ones. 
From a topic in an environment we can easily recover the partition it would 
induce on the current information state. Therefore, we will be able to define all 
of the logical notions which are relevant for a theory of questions and answers. 
Since our topics are as fine-grained as abstracts, we will improve, though, on the 
partition theory with respect to phenomena like constituent answers or alternative 
questions. On the other hand, since interrogatives are associated with a uniform 
semantic type, we will also improve on the structured meaning account with respect 
to the embedding and coordination of questions. Finally, since, as in Gawron, topics 
encode domain restrictions, we will be able to account for the impact of questions 
on subsequent domains of alternatives and account for the ' gentlemen' example 
discussed in the introductory section of this article. 
2. 1 .  A closer look 
The proposed semantics is an extension of Aloni, Beaver, Clark 1999 (built on 
Gawron 1996) with an explicit analysis of interrogative sentences. Zeevat 1994 and 
van Rooy 1997 defend similar ideas in somewhat different formalisms. 
Formulae are associated with context change potentials. A context 3e is 
a pair consisting of an information state 3 (a set of world-assignment pairs) and 
an environment e (a sequence of states). States encode what is known and what 
antecedents are available for future anaphora; environments encode information 
about what is merely under discussion. Contexts 3e can be depicted as in (4) where 
each box stands for an information state. 
(4) (3 : 0 ,  e :  01 ,  . . . , On) 
For example, the empty box in (Sa) stands for the state of minimal information, 
whereas the box in (Sb) encodes the information that x is P. 
(5) a. ° r-+ { (0 , w) I w E  W} (minimal information) 
b. I x: P(x) I r-+ { (g , w) I g(x) E w (P) }  (x is P) 
Questions set up (or expand on previously introduced) topics. Interrogative 
sentences are formed by prefixing a question mark and a sequence of variables 
X l , • . .  , Xn = X to a formula. The effect of updating with sentence ? xep is that the last 
element in the output environment is a state that verifies ep. 
A polar question like (6a), represented as in (6b), extends the environment 
with a state that entails that Mary smokes (e.g. (6c» . 
THE DYNAMICS OF QUESTIONS AND Focus 
(6) a. Does Mary smoke? 
b. ?S(m) 
c. (O) [?S(m)] ( O , I S(m) � 
A constituent question like (7a) represented as (7b) extends the environment with a 
state which encodes the information that x is a smoker (e.g. (7c» . Intuitively we 
can think of (7b) as introducing the set of smokers as topic under label x. 
(7) a. Who smokes? 
b. ?xS(x) 
c. (O) [?xS(x) ] ( O , I x : Sex) I) 
Topics and sets of propositions 
From a topic in Be we can uniquely derive the corresponding Hamblin denotationl 
or G&S partition both expressed as a(n equivalence) relation over the current state 
s. As an illustration, consider the topics represented in (8b) and (9b) introduced 
by the questions (8a) and (9a). The partitions and Hamblin denotations induced by 
these topics can be depicted as in (8c) and (9c). Assume that j and m are the only 
individuals in the domain. 
(8) a. ?xS (x) 
b. (0 ,  I x: S(x) �  
bl· I SCm) I c. Ham m: S(j )  
(9) a .  ? S(m) 
b. (0 ,  I SCm) � 
Vx.S(x) 
G&S: � __ V�x�(�S�(X�) _B __ x_=_m�) __ � Vx(S(x) B x = j)  
Vx(S(x) B (x = j v x = m) )  
c. Hamblin: I SCm) I G&S: 
The state-environment pairs in (b) are more fine-grained than the G&S par­
titioned states in (c). E.g. (9) after (8) does not add anything to the partition, but it 
extends the environment in a non-trivial way. 
(10) a. ?xS (x)I\?S(m) 
b. (0 ,  I x: Sex) I, I SCm) � f--t 
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We will exploit these two levels of fine-grainedness in a crucial way. We will 
define the logical notion of entailment, F, in terms of the partitioned states (exactly 
as in Groenendijk 1998-99), and the more discourse oriented notion of support, 
�, in terms of the more fine-grained state-environment pairs. As for indicative 
sentences, support and entailment are the same notion. But, they crucially differ 
with respect to questions. 
A question is entailed iff its update does not further partition the input state. 
An interrogative ? x'IjJ is entailed after an indicative ¢ iff the indicative is a complete 
answer to ?x'IjJ. An interrogative ?x'IjJ is entailed after another interrogative ?fj¢ iff 
any complete answer to ?fj¢ is a complete answer to ?x'IjJ. E.g. 
(1 1) a. 'ix(S(x) +-+ x = m) F ?xS(x) , 
b. ?xS(x) F ?S(m) 
but S(m) � ?xS(x) 
On the other hand, a question is supported iff the topic it introduces is al­
ready entailed in the input context, either by the input state or by an old topic in 
the input environment. After an indicative ¢, interrogative ? x'IjJ is supported iff ¢ 
entails 3x'IjJ, that is, if ¢ entails a positive congruent answer to the question. After 
another interrogative ?fj¢, sentence ?x'IjJ is supported iff 3fj¢ entails 3x'IjJ. 
(12) a. S(m) � ?xS(x) 
b. ?S(m) � ?xS(x) , but ?xS(x) � ?S(m) 
Entailment seems to be relevant for indirect uses of interrogatives. The 
sentences (13a-b) are valid implications, but (13c) is not. 
(13) a. If John knows that only Mary smokes, then John knows who smokes. 
b. If John knows who smokes, then John knows whether Mary smokes. 
c. If John knows that Mary smokes, then John knows who smokes. 
As we will see, support is relevant for direct uses of questions in discourse 
and will play a crucial role for our characteri�tion of focus and its pragmatic role. 
Topics and quantification 
Topics encode domain restrictions. An update with a quantified sentence 3x¢ only 
modifies the state parameter but crucially depends on the environment parameter, in 
particular on the last topic in which the quantified variable is defined, e (x) , which 
encodes all restrictions previously placed on x.  
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(14) a. ?xS(x) /\ 3xP(x) 
b. (O) [?xS (x)] (O , l x: s(x) H3xP(x)] (I x: S(x) /\ P(x) 1, l x: S(x) � 
The valid entailment in (15) illustrate a crucial feature of our formalism. 
Questions can restrict subsequent quantification if coindexed. 
Presupposition 
Topics can be crucially presupposed. Presupposition (denoted by Beaver's &) ex­
presses conditions on the input context which must be satisfied for the sentence 
to be defined (Stalnaker, Heim, Beaver). An update with a presupposition &¢ is 
defined in Be iff Be supports ¢. 
Note that presupposition is defined in terms of support rather than entail­
ment. This means that a presupposed topic like &[? xl (a, x) ] is defined after I (a, b) , 
but not after ?xyI(y , x) . This notion of presupposition will play a crucial role for 
our treatment of focus. 
Focus 
Focus indicates the presence of a topic in the context. More specifically, as in the 
structured meaning approach, focus leads to a 'partition' of the sentence into : (1) a 
presupposed topic (background); and (ii) an existential sentence (focus) .  
A sentence like (16a) represented as (16b) presupposes that the set S of 
smokers is under discussion and asserts that Mary is part of it. 
(16) a. [Mary]F smokes. 
b. &[?xS(x) ] /\ 3x (x = m) 
c. ( O , l x: S(x) � [&[?xS(x) ] /\ 3xx = m] ( l x: S(x) /\ (x=m) I, l x: S(x) � 
This analysis covers focus in questions as illustrated in (17). Question (17a) 
represented in (17b) again presupposes that the set of smokers is under discussion, 
and asks whether Mary is among them. 
(17) a. Does [MarY]F smoke? 
b. ? (&[?xS(x)] /\ 3x(x = m) )  
c. (0 ,  1 x: Sex) I) [?&[?xS(x) ] /\ 3x (x = m)] (0 ,  I x : Sex) I, I x : Sex) /\ x=m � 
Note that from the representations in (16b) and (17b) we can recover the 
ordinary meanings of the sentences, (16b) F= S(m) , and (17b) F= ?S(m) . 
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3. Applications 
In this section, we will show how the formalism presented in the previous section 
allows us to solve the problems discussed in the introductory part of the present 
article. Let us first briefly present our analysis of which-interrogatives, which will 
play a role in some of the following applications. 
3 . 1 .  Which-questions 
We assume that a which-phrase gives rise to the presupposition that the set over 
which it ranges is already given as a topic. Questions (18a) and (19a) are repre­
sented as in (18b) and (19b). 
(18) a. Which men are bachelors? 
(19) a. Which bachelors are men? 
b. 8[?xM(x)] A?xB(x) 
b. 8[?xB(x) ]A?xM(x) ) 
Question (18) presupposes that the set of men is under discussion and it 
asks which of them are bachelors. Question (19) presupposes that the set of bach­
elors is under discussion and it asks which of them are men. In distinction with 
Groenendijk & Stokhof's (1984) treatment, according to which (18) and (19) are 
equivalent, this analysis allows us to capture the contrast between these two ques­
tions. Although (18b) and (19b) determine the same partition, under the assumption 
that in all worlds all bachelors are men, (19b) is vacuous whenever defined. In dis­
tinction with (18b), which is not a trivial question. 
3 .2. Association with focus: only 
We treat the focusing operator only as an indexed sentential operator only x, where 
x = Xl , . .  , Xn are focused variables (see Aloni et aI 1999). The interpretation of 
only x involves a universal quantification over the focused variable if which is au­
tomatically restricted by the presupposition expressed by focus. As an illustration 
consider sentence (20a) represented as in (20b): 
(20) a. John only introduced [BillJF to Sue. 
b. onlYx (8[?xI(j, x ,  s)] A 3x (x = b) )  
As in standard analyses of (un)selective binding, only x changes the quantificational 
force of the quantifier binding X from existelltial to universal. Given the presuppo­
sition expressed by focus, this universal quantification is automatically restricted to 
individuals John introduced to Sue. In a minimal context satisfying the presupposi­
tion of the sentence, we predict for (20a) the expected meaning 'The only individ­
ual John introduced to Sue is Bill ' ,  as in the standard analyses of this phenomenon, 
(20b) F= 'ily(I(j, y, s) ++ y = b) .2 
In distinction with the standard analyses, however, we have a systematic 
account of other restrictions on the quantificational domain of only which can arise 
from sources other then focus, for example a preceding question like (21a). 
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(21) a. Which gentleman did John introduce to Sue? 
b. 8[?xG(x) ]A?xI(j, x, s)  
c.  John only introduced [Bill]F to Sue. 
d. onlYx (8[?xI(j, x ,  s) ] A 3x (x = b) ) 
Mter (21a), (21c) can obtain the weaker interpretation 'The only gentleman John 
introduced to Sue is Bill ' ,  (21b), (21d) F Vy( (G(y) A I(j, y , s ) ) ++ y = b) . 
3.3. Congruence 
In this section we will show how our dynamic analysis enables us to give an inter­
esting characterization of the notion of discourse congruence which covers contex­
tual restrictions while avoiding problems of over- and under-focus, and uniformly 
applies to answers, questions, strategies and denials. 
In our proposal a sentence ¢ is congruent after 'ljJ iff (i) the presupposition of 
¢ is defined after 'l/J, and (ii) no more material is in focus than needed to satisfy (i) .  
Our conditions (i) and (ii) are closely related to Schwarzschild 's (1999) 
givenness and avoid focus constraints .  As Schwarzschild 's givenness, condition 
(i) is a formalization of the traditional idea that non-focused material must be old. 
In distinction with Schwarzschild, however, our analysis of givenness is of a rather 
global nature: the existential closure of the non-focused parts of a whole clause 
has to 'given' in the context, not the individual words themselves.3 Condition (ii) 
corresponds to Schwarzschild 's optimality theoretic constraint to avoid unnecessary 
focus: in our framework it will prevent us from placing more material in focus than 
is strictly necessary to allow the context to support the focal presupposition of the 
sentence. 
Focus presupposes a question and presupposition is defined in term of sup­
port. Therefore in order to understand condition (i) it is important to recall after 
which sentences a question is supported. As noted above, and explained more for­
mally in the appendix, a question ? x'ljJ is supported after an indicative ¢ or interrog­
ative ?x¢ iff ¢ or 3x¢ entails 3x'ljJ. By this notion of support, we can account for 
the intuition that a sentence is congruent because it either 'matches ' the question 
the sentence addresses example (22), or it stands in contrast with an earlier made 
assertion (example (23» . 
\ 
(22) a. Who voted for Mary? ?xV(x, m) 
b. [John]F voted for Mary. 8[?xV (x ,  m)] A 3x (x = j) 
(23) a. Bill voted for Mary. V(b, m) 
b. No, [John]F voted for Mary. 8[?xV(x ,  m)] A 3x (x = j )  
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Sentence (22b) and (23b) are congruent after (22a) or (23a), because both 
(b) sentences are minimally focused to be defined after the respective antecedents. 
In the same context, the alternative focus structures in (24) are predicted to be in­
felicitous. Sentence (24a) is undefined after (22a) or (23a). Had John not been in 
focus in (24b), then the presupposition of the sentence would already be supported 
after (22a) or (23a). 
(24) a. *John voted for [Mary]F .  8[?xV(j, x) ] /\ 3x (x = m) 
b. * [John]F voted for [MarY]F . 8[?xyV(x, y) ]  /\ 3x (x = j )  /\ 3y(y = m) 
Just like Roberts 1996, our notion of congruence applies to questions and 
question strategies as well. Also in this case, underfocused questions will be unde­
fined and overfocused ones will violate our minimality constraint. 
Finally, our dynamic analysis also immediately predicts correctly for se­
quences in which contextual restrictions play a crucial role. Since question (25) 
supports question (22a), in our analysis the two questions pose the same condition 
on the focal structure of their answers. 
(25) Which Democrats voted for Mary? 8[?xD(x)]/\?xV (x, m) 
3.4. Constituent Answers 
A constituent answer is expressed as an existential sentence, the domain of which 
is crucially restricted by the preceding question. 
The following analysis of yes-no answers is based on Dekker 2002 which 
also has a treatment of plural and quantified answers. Yes and no are represented as 
in (26d): 
(26) a. Does Mary smoke? 
c. [Yes]F/[No]F . 
b. ?S(m) 
d. 3T /,3T 
Given these representations we correctly predict that after (26a), yes means 'Mary 
smokes' :  (26b) , 3T F SCm) ; and no means 'Mary does not smoke ' : (26b) , ,3T F 
,SCm) . 
Term answers like John are represented as in (27f). 
(27) a. Who smokes? 
c. Who doesn't smoke? 
e. [John]F .  
b .  ?xS(x) 
• 
d. ?x,S(x) 
f. 3x(x = j )  
After (27a), John means 'John smokes ' :  (27b), (27f) F S(j ) ;  after (27c), it means 
'John does not smoke ' :  (27d), (27f) F ,S(j ) .  
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3.5. Alternative questions 
In this section we discuss the contrast between polar and alternative questions. 
Proposition set theories of questions in both the G&S and HamblinlKarttunen tra­
ditions have problems in accounting for alternative readings of questions as argued 
in von Stechow 1991 and Krifka 2001 .  We would like to show that our analysis is 
fine-grained enough to express both question readings. 
Question (28) is ambiguous between a polar question reading (expected an­
swers: yeslno) and an alternative question reading (expected answers: tea!coffe). 
(28) Do you want coffee or tea? 
Intonation seems to play a disambiguating role. In alternative questions, the alter­
natives are stressed. 
(29) Do you want COFFEE or TEA? a. *Yes / *No. b. Coffee / Tea. 
If we assume for (29) the focal structure in (31a), the contrast between polar and 
alternative readings follows directly from our analysis of focus. 
(30) a. [Do you want coffee or tea]F ?  
b. ? (W(c) V W(t) ) 
c. Yes / No. 
d. 3T / -dT 
e. topic: I W(c)VW(t) I H f. Hamblin: I You want coffee or tea 
(31) a. Do you want [coffee]F or [tea]F?  
b. ? (8[?xW(x)] 1\ 3xx = c V x = t) 
c. Coffee / Tea. 
d. 3x(x = c) / 3x(x = t) 
(polar) 
(alternative) 
. I I 
. You want coffee e. tOpIC: x: W(x)/\(x=c V x=t) H f. Hamblm: f---,Yi"..,,-- ---l 
. . ou want tea 
The formulae (30b) and (31b) set up different topics, therefore (i) they ex­
press different questions (compare the Hamblin denotation in (f) induced by the 
introduced topic in (e» ; and (ii) they allow different constituent answers. 
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3 .6. Embedded questions 
In the introduction we pointed out that although the fine-grainedness of the struc­
tured meaning analysis of questions is needed to account for constituent answers 
and alternative questions, it is problematic too. By assuming that different types of 
interrogatives have denotations of different categories, the structured meaning ac­
count has problems with the coordination and embedding of questions. This prob­
lem disappears once one assumes a propositional set theory as those proposed by 
Hamblin, Karttunen or Groenendijk & Stokhof. According to these latter theories, 
polar and (multiple) wh-questions all have denotations of the same category, and all 
these questions can thus be coordinated under know and wonder as in (32): 
(32) Adam knows/wonders whether it 's Mary 's party, who is invited, and who 
will kiss whom. 
Only Groenendijk & Stokhof's analysis, however, correctly predicts that 
indicatives can also be freely coordinated under know with interrogatives: 
(33) Adam knows that it 's Mary birthday and who is invited to come. 
Moreover, by thinking of the denotation of a question as an equivalence 
relation, the inclusion relation accounts for entailment not only in case of declara­
tives, but also for interrogatives. Our approach shares with Groenendijk & Stokhof 
these desirable consequences. First, coordination between indicatives and interrog­
atives of any ' type' is unproblematic: a context Se can also be updated with ¢ if ¢ 
contains both an indicative and an interrogative. This updated context gives rise to 
a structured state: the partition P(se [¢] ) .  As shown in the appendix, entailment can 
be defined in terms of subsistence between such structured states. Taking Ka (i) to 
denote the epistemically accessible worlds to Adam in possibility i, and ignoring 
anaphoric dependencies and presuppositions, we can simply assume that the state­
environment pair with respect to which the embedded clause should be interpreted 
in possibility i = (g , w) is K; (i) = { (h , w ) : h = 9 1\ v E Ka(w) }eo ,  where eo is 
the ' empty' environment which makes P(K; (i) )  = {U, j/) : j, j' E K: (i) } .  Now 
we can define the update of context Se with sentence ' know(a, ¢) ' as follows: 
(34) se [know (a, ¢)] {i E S : K: (i) entails ¢}e 
This has the result that sentence (33), for instance, is predicted to be true in 
possibility i = (g , w ) iff (i) Adam knows th�t it's Mary's birthday, and (ii) Adam 
knows that d is invited to come if and only if d is actually invited in w, for every d.4 
Groenendijk & Stokhof (1982) account for the fact that to wonder, in dis­
tinction with to know, cannot embed indicatives by assuming that the former verb 
is intensional and not extensional. We won't make use of this assumption, however. 
Instead, we will assume that a sentence of the form 'wonder ( a, ¢) ' can only be true 
in i if (i) K; (i) does not entail ¢, but (ii) ¢ does not eliminate any possibilities of 
K; ( i) .  This has the result that ¢ cannot be an indicative, because that would either 
eliminate possibilities, or else be entailed by K: (i) .  
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3 .7. Relevance 
In this section, we extend Groenendijk's (1999) notion of relevance to questions. 
In doing so, we propose a formalization of Roberts 's (1996) insight that a ques­
tion is relevant iff it is part of a strategy to answer the immediate question under 
discussion.5 
Groenendijk 1999 proposes the following characterization of the notion of 
a relevant (or pertinent, coherent) move in a discourse: 
(35) A move is relevant iff it is (i) about the issue under discussion; (ii) non 
vacuous; and (iii) consistent. 
Groenendijk's characterization of (i) in terms of licensing6 and (ii) in terms 
of entailment prevents a correct application of this notion to questions. According 
to Groenendijk, questions are always licensed, and are informative iff they are not 
entailed. Therefore, we obtain the predictions in (36), which are highly counter­
intuitive. 
(36) a. Who smokes? 
b. Well, does Mary smoke? 
c. Well, does Mary work? 
(not relevant) 
(relevant) 
Question (b) is not relevant after (a) because, since it is entailed, it is not infor­
mative. Question (c) is relevant because licensed, not entailed and consistent. In­
tuitively though, both questions are non-vacuous moves after (a), but only (b) is 
about (a), since, intuitively, it suggests a strategy to answer (a). Entailment does 
not seem to be the right notion to characterize non-vacuous questions, and Groe­
nendijk's licensing should be modified to capture aboutness of questions, and not 
only of assertions. 
We propose to define informativity in terms of support rather than entail­
ment and to generalize Groenendijk's notion of licensing as follows. Let ¢? be ¢, 
if ¢ is an interrogative, ? ¢ otherwise. A sentence ¢ is licensed iff ¢? is entailed. 
Intuitively, a sentence is licensed iff it exclusively addresses the question under 
discussion Q either by giving a partial answer to Q (as in Groenendijk 1999) or 
by introducing a question the answers of which are partial answers to Q, i .e. an 
entailed question. 
The obtained notion of relevance gives us the correct predictions in (37). 
(37) a. Who smokes? 
b. Well, does Mary smoke? 
c. Mary smokes. 
(relevant) 
(relevant) 
d. Well, does Mary work? (not relevant) 
Sub-question (37b) is licensed, but not supported (although entailed) after (37a), 
therefore it is relevant, as well as sentence (37c). Question (37d) is not relevant 
because it is not licensed. 
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3 .8. Topic 
In the literature, there exist two popular views on what a sentence is about. Ac­
cording to a tradition starting with Paul 1880, the topic of a sentence is the question 
the sentence is addressing. According to another tradition going back at least to 
Goodman 1961 ,  the topic of a sentence is the referent the sentence is about. In 
more recent analyses along the second tradition, e.g. Reinhart 1981 and Vallduvi 
1990, this referent need not be a particular real entity, but is thought of rather as a 
discourse referent. By representing questions as discourse referents in an environ­
ment, we suggest that these two views are two sides of the same coin. 
What a sentence is about is also linguistically marked, in English, by the use 
of accent. 
(38) a. Who ate what? What about Fred? What did he eat? 
b. FredB ate the beansA . 
According to Jackendoff 1972, the rising A accent marks dependent focus, while 
the falling B accent marks independent focus. According to our analysis, focus 
presupposes a question: it indicates that it addresses a certain question. Because two 
foci are used, it presupposes at least the multiple wh-question (39a) as in Roberts 
1996. However, as in Biiring 1999, we will also assume that (38b) presupposes 
(39b). 
(39) a. Who ate what? 
b. What did Fred eat? 
?xyAte(x, y) 
?yAte(j, y) 
According to Roberts 1996, the two questions form part of a questioning 
strategy. Our notion of relevance between questions shows that the question (39b) 
can be part of a strategy to answer (39a), but not the other way around. Thus, we 
can determine that the presuppositions and assertion of (38b) should be represented 
as follows: 
(40) a. FredB ate the beansA . 
b. 8[?xyAte(x,  y) ]  /\ 8[?yAte(j, y) ]  /\ 3y [y = b] or equivalently 
c. 8[?xyAte(x, y) ]  /\ 8[?x (x = f) ]  /\ 3y[y = b] 
The ordinary meaning of the sentence is entailed: (40c) � Ate(j, b) . 
What Jackendoff called A and B acc�nt is called focal and topical accent 
respectively by Biiring 1999. Biiring proposes that a sentence like (38b) not only 
has a focal-value, but also a topic-value. The former corresponds with our question 
(39b), but the latter is not a question, but rather a set of questions: for each relevant 
individual d the question what d ate. To account for the intuition that (38b) is only 
a partial answer to question (39a), he states an extra disputability condition. If 
we denote the topic-value of A by [ [AW, the condition says that if in A a topical 
accent is used, at least one question in [ [AW must still be open. This disputability 
condition, however, gives rise to the so-called last answer problem. 
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(41) a. Who ate what? 
b. Mary B ate sprouts A, and 
c. FredB ate the beansA . 
Mter (41b) is given, answer (41c) might resolve the whole question (41a), 
which is in conflict with Buring's disputability condition. We have taken over 
Roberts ' (1996) suggestion that ' topic' -accent indicates, or presupposes, the use 
of a certain questioning strategy: (38b) presupposes both (39a) and (39b), and con­
gruence demands that the former must have been asked before the latter. But note 
that from our relevance condition we can still derive Buring's disputability in case 
(38b) is used out of context without making use of non-ordinary semantic values .  
The reason is that the assertion presupposes questions (39a) and (39b), and that our 
relevance condition on questions demands that (39b) can only be part of a strategy 
to answer (39a) in case there is at least one individual different from Fred whose 
eating behavior is still in question. 
Buring 1999 makes crucial use of his disputability condition to explain why 
sentence (42a) only has a -,'if reading, i .e . ,  that (42a) cannot mean (42b): 
(42) a. AllB politicians are notA corrupt. 
b. Vx[Pol {x) --+ -,crpt(x)] 
However, this much follows already from our assumption that sentences 
with independent and dependent focus presuppose two questions, and the general 
condition that question Q' cannot be part of a strategy to answer Q if they denote the 
same partition. Notice that it follows from our reasoning above that (42a) presup­
poses either 8[?xPol {x) ]A?xCrpt(x) and (43a), or 8[?xPol (x) ]A?xCrpt{x) and 
(43b): 
(43) a. Vx[Pol (x) -+ Crpt(x)] -Nx[Pol (x) -+ Crpt(x)] 
Vx[Pol (x) -+ Crpt(x)] b. Vx[Pol (x) -+ ...,Crpt(x)] 
Now suppose that (42a) actually presupposed (43b). Assuming that the pre­
supposition of a question is the union of its possible answers, it follows that (42a) 
must presuppose that either all politicians are corrupt, or no politician is corrupt . 
• 
Assuming that question Q' can only be part of a strategy to resolve ' goal ' -question 
Q if Q' and Q do not denote the same partition, we demand that partition (43b) is 
not the same partition as the one denoted by 8[?xPol (x) ]/\?xCrpt (x) . This means 
that there must be at least more than one politician, and that it is not presupposed 
that either all politicians are corrupt, or that none of them is corrupt. So, our condi­
tions demand that the partition due to 8[?xPol {x)] A  ?xCrpt(x) denotes a cell where 
some but not all politicians are corrupt. But this is inconsistent with the presuppo­
sition of (43b), which rules out the possibility that (42a) presupposes (43b). The 
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sequence consisting of 8[?xPol (x) ]A  ?xCrpt(x) and (43a), on the other hand, is 
predicted to be appropriate, and will thus be chosen. But this means that(42a) can 
be given only as answer to (43a), and thus can receive the -,\:1 reading only. 
4. Conclusion 
We have analyzed within dynamic semantics how questions can restrict the domain 
of quantificational sentences used later in a discourse. We have done this by extend­
ing Gawron's (1996) dynamic analysis of domain restriction with questions. Our 
analysis of questions incorporates Groenendijk's (1999) logic of interrogation, but 
improves on it by introducing (basically) the abstracts underlying the questions to 
the discourse. In this way we are able to account for the context-dependent meaning 
of constituent-answers, free focus, association with focus and how the domain of 
focus sensitive operators like only can be determined by a previous question. 
Appendix 
Formal Definitions 
The vocabulary of our language is like that of standard first-order predicate logic 
with identity, but with a polyadic existential quantifier ::Ix! , . . .  , xn, and with the 
addition of with a sentential operator onlYXl , o o ,Xn ' a presupposition operator f) and a 
question operator ?Xl , . . .  , xn • We do not have compound interrogatives or quantifi­
cation into questions, but we have presupposed questions and can form sequences 
of questions (and assertions). As for the semantics, formulae are associated with 
context change potentials. A context S e is a pair consisting of an environment e and 
an information state s. An information state consists of a set of world-assignment 
pairs. An environments is a sequence of information states. If c = Se is a context, 
then S (c) = s and E(c) = e. 
Elements of a state are called possibilities, given a possibility i = (w, g) , 
we will write i (a) to refer to the denotation of a with respect to gi and Wi . As in 
Dekker (1993), possibilities are ordered by an extension relation � :  j extends i, 
i � j iff Wi = Wj & 9i � gj . This extension relation carries over to an ordering 
relation between information states :  s is a substate of t, s � t iff \:Ii E s :  i -< t, 
where i � t iff ::lj E t : i � j. 
Now we can give a recursive definition of the context-change potential of 
the formulae of the language. The basic formulae are defined as expected :  they can 
only influence the state parameter s and eliminate possibilities in s in which the 
formulae are false: 
In the interpretation rule of negation, we make crucial use of the ordering relation 
� .  Just like atomic formulae, negation influences only the state parameter: 
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2. 8e [,¢] = {i E 8 I i -I< S(Se [¢] ) }e 
Conjunction is defined as standard in dynamic semantics as sequential update: 
Until now the environments played virtually no role. They are crucial, however, 
for the semantic analysis of quantified sentences. The update of context 8e with an . 
existential sentence :3XI , . . .  , xn¢ is defined in terms the merge of two information 
states. The merging of information state 8 with information state 8' , s A  s', is defined 
as the ' least upper bound' of s and s' (see Dekker 1993): 
s A  s' = {i I :3j E s : :3}' E s' : dom(i) = dom(j ) U dom(}' )  & j -< i & }' --< i} 
If we define random assignment, s [x] , as { (w ,  g [x/d] ) :  (w, g) E 8 & d E D}, 
we can define the update of Se with an existential sentence in terms of this merge­
operator as follows. Assume XI , . . .  , Xn = x are not defined in S .7 
where e(x I '  . . .  , Xn) is the last state in e in which the variables X l ,  . . .  , Xn are de­
fined. More formally, if e = (eI , . . .  , em) ,  then (i) e (XI ' . . .  , Xm) = em, if n = 0; 
(ii) e(XI ' . . .  , Xn) = ei in e, such that Xl ,  . . .  , Xn E dom(ei) and 'v'ej [xI , . . .  , Xn E 
dom( ej ) -+ j ::; i] ,  otherwise. 
Quantificational sentences make use of the environment, but have no influence on 
these environments themselves. Only questions have. The effect of updating con­
text Se with question ?x¢ is that the last element in the new environment is a set of 
possibilities that verify ¢. If e = (el ' . . .  , en) and e' = (e� , . . .  , e�) are environments, 
then e + e' = (el ' . . .  , en , e� , . . .  , e�) .  
5.  8e [?X¢] = Se' where e' = e + S(8e [:3X¢] ) .  
An update with a quantifier or a question will depend on the last introduced state 
in the current environment in which the quantified variables are defined. Yes-no 
questions and answers will depend on the last introduced state. 
Finally, we define the operator only x which is analyzed as an asymmetric 
adverb of quantification (see Dekker 1993). Let j -<x i iff j -< i and dom(gi ) 
dom(gj) U {x} . Let ¢ be of the form a[?x�hl A :3x�h 
6. 8e [onlyx(¢) ] = {j E 8 I {i I j -<x i & i -< S(8e [:3X�I] ) }  C {i I z -< 
S(8e [¢] ) }}e 
Disjunction, implication and universal quantifier are defined as standard in 
terms of conjunction, negation existential quantifier. 
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Topic and sets of propositions 
From a topic ek of domain Xl , . . .  , Xn = X in a context Se we can derive the corre­
sponding Hamblin denotation, H�e ,  or G&S partition, Pte ,  both expressed as a(n 
equivalence) relation over s . 
Definition 1 [Hamblin denotation] 
H�e = { (i , j ) I i , j E S & 3d E nn : i [x/d1 -< (s 1\ ek )  & j [x/dJ -< ( s  1\ ek ) } 
Definition 2 [G&S partition] 
Pte = { (i , j) I i , j E s & 'lid E nn : i [x/d1 -< (s 1\ ek)  ++ j [x/d1 -< (s 1\ ek) } 
Entailment and Support 
Building on Groenendijk (1998, 1999), we define entailment in term of subsistence 
between structured states. By P (s e) we will denote the partition induced on s by all 
the topics in e. Let L(e) be the length of e, i.e. if e = (el ' . . .  , em) ,  then L(e) = m. 
Definition 3 P(se) = nkEL(e) (p:e ) 
Partitions P( se) assigned to contexts Se are equivalent to the structured states a 
defined in Groenendijk 1998. We denote by " the pair (i ,  j )  of world-assignment 
pairs elements of such a structured states. Groenendijk defines subsistence between 
structured states in terms of the notion of -< between world-assignment pairs de­
fined above. A pair (i , j ) subsists in (i' , j') , (i , j )  -< (i' , j' ) iff i -< i' & j -< j' .  
This relation between pairs of possibilities carries over to a relation between struc­
tured states: a -< a' iff 'll" E a : " -< a' , where " -< a' iff 3,,' E a' : " -< ,,' . 
We can now define entailment. We denote by min..p the context of minimal 
information in which an update with ¢ is defined. 
Definition 4 [Entailment] 
(i) Se F ¢ iff P(se) -< P(se [¢] ) 
(ii) ¢l , ' "  ¢n F � iff min..pl ,  . . . ,..pn ,1/J [¢] F � 
Support is defined in terms of subsistence between contexts, rather than 
partitioned states. A context Se subsists in context tf, Se -< tf iff S -< t and e -< f, 
where an environment e subsists in f, e -< f, iff 'll h E f : 3ei E e : ei -< h·  
Definition 5 [Support] 
(i) Se � ¢ iff Se+s -< se+s [¢] 
(ii) ¢b . . . , ¢n � � iff min..pl , . . . ,..pn ,1/J � � 
In terms of support, we define Beaver's (1995) presupposition operator. 
Definition 6 [Presupposition] 
se [8¢] = s:' iff se [¢] = s:' & Se � ¢, undefined otherwise. 
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Endnotes 
* Part of this material is joint work with David Beaver, Brady Clark. Special thanks to Paul 
Dekker for insightful discussions and to Darrin Hindsill for enhancing our English. 
1 Just like Roberts 1996, we also call the Hamblin denotation of a question not the set of 
its congruent answers, but the set of its questioned propositions. For this notion, we do 
not have to assume that the denotation of polar questions is determined differently from the 
denotation of (multiple) wh-questions. Standard Hamblin denotations for polar questions 
can also be derived, but, in our view, are less interesting. 
2 As in the structured meaning theory, we have direct access to the focused value. Therefore 
a number of examples which constitute a problem for Rooth's alternative semantics, are 
unproblematic in the present framework. For example we can express association with 
multiple foci (Krifka 1992), and we avoid Rooth's problem of intensionality (Rooth 1985 
ch. 2 footnote 13). Sentence Nine is only the square of [threeJF expresses a falsehood in 
our analysis. 
30ur analysis also has nothing to say about embedded F-marking and de-accenting. 
40f course, to account for focus in the embedded clause, we might assume a more interest­
ing interaction between Ka (i) and the environment of the 'main' context. 
5Eventually our characterization of the notion of a strategy of inquiries should take into 
account the average informativity of the possible answers, or borrowing a term from infor­
mation theory, the entropy of the related questions (see van Rooy 2000). This would allow 
us distinguish sub-question (b) from (c) in example (44). The former is intuitively part of a 
much more efficient strategy to answer (a). 
(44) a. Who ate what? 
b. What did Fred eat? 
c. Did Fred and Mary eat the beans? 
6Groenendijk's licensing turns out to be equivalent to Lewis's (1988) notion of aboutness. 
7 As in Heim 1983, variables cannot be reset. So, in addition to formulae containing free 
variables, quantified sentences are partial updates as well. Since this issue is not directly 
relevant to the issues discussed in this article, we will pass over it in what follows. 
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